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Using a unique sample of new Ph.D. economists in 1987 and 1997, we examine how job 
seekers and their employers alter their search strategies in strong versus weak markets.  The 1987 
academic market was strong while the 1997 market was much weaker.  A multimarket theory of 
optimal search suggests that job seekers will respond to a weakening market by lowering their 
reservation utility.  This in turn affects their search strategies at the extensive margin (which 
markets to enter) and the intensive margin (how many applications to submit per market).  
Meanwhile, employers respond to the weakening market by raising their hiring standards.  The 
combination of strategies on the supply and demand sides suggest that high quality applicants 
will obtain an increased share of academic interviews in weak markets while applicants from 
weaker schools will increasingly secure interviews outside of the academic market.  Empirical 
results show that in the bust market, graduates of elite schools shifted their search strategies to 
include weaker academic institutions, while graduates of lower ranked schools shifted their 
applications away from academia and toward the business sector.  In bust conditions, academic 
institutions increasingly concentrate their interviews on elite school graduates, women and U.S. 
residents.  (JEL:  J44, J60)I. INTRODUCTION 
The market for Ph.D. economists has attracted a great deal of attention in the literature.  
This is not surprising given the personal stake that many economists hold regarding the 
performance of this market.  Yet, another motivation for studying this particular labor market 
rests on its highly organized structure, characterized by three distinct segments: advertisement of 
jobs during the few months prior to the Allied Social Science Association (ASSA) meetings, 
interviewing candidates at the ASSA meetings in late December or early January, and on-site 
visits and offers during the few months after the ASSA meetings. 
Most studies of this market concentrate on explaining variation in earnings or type of 
employment, with variables such as gender, age, race, nationality, quality of Ph.D. institution, 
and number of publications significantly affecting employment or earnings success (see, e.g., 
Barbezat (1992), Broder (1993), Formby et al. (1993), Singell and Stone (1993), McMillan and 
Singell (1994), Kahn (1995), Siegfried and Stock (1999) and List (2000)).  Although 
employment outcomes of new Ph.D. economists have been thoroughly addressed, little attention 
has been given to how new Ph.D. economists set search strategies.  Moreover, as studies tend to 
examine outcomes in one hiring period, evidence of intertemporal change in search strategies 
and outcomes is lacking.    
To fill the current gaps in the literature, we address the intertemporal relationship 
between applicant characteristics, search strategies, and outcomes of new Ph.D. economists.  
This is accomplished through the use of a survey instrument that documents behavior and 
outcomes of participants in the Ph.D. labor market in two years−1987 and 1997−that we loosely 
deem as “boom” and “bust” markets, respectively.
1  We organize the remainder of the paper as 
follows.  Section II discusses the nature of those two markets.  Section III presents a model that illustrates how agents on the supply and demand side will alter search strategies in response to 
perceived strength of the market.  In Section IV, we discuss the survey instrument that was used 
to gather information on Ph.D. candidate behavior in the 1987 and 1997 markets.  As shown in 
Section V, the survey results indicate that search intensity is naturally tied to the severity of 
excess labor supply.  In Section VI, a model of search outcome is estimated across the two 
market periods.  The results show that the effect of various applicant characteristics on numbers 
of interviews, visits, and job offers is related to the strength of the market.  Concluding remarks 
are provided in Section VII. 
II.  THE 1987 AND 1997 MARKETS FOR Ph.D. ECONOMISTS 
  We concentrate on two labor market periods, 1986-87 and 1996-97.  Serendipitously, the 
last years coincided exactly with Siegfried and Stock’s (1999) survey paper on labor market 
outcomes for Ph.D. economists.  They found that graduates from higher ranked schools were 
more likely to have a full time job, were paid better, and were more likely to agree that their job 
was commensurate with their education.  Graduates from weaker programs were less successful 
financially, but virtually all were employed.  Nevertheless, Siegfried and Stock refer to a 
substantial number of graduates from all ranks who expressed disappointment in their market 
outcomes, with typical assessments about the market ranging from the most positive (“I got 
lucky”) to less so (“It sucks!”). 
  The negative reaction of new Ph.D.s to the 1997 market is understandable in light of data 
from Job Openings for Economists—see Table 1.  While 1997 was unusually bleak, there were 
substantial differences across sectors.  In particular, the academic and government sectors were 
weak, while the business sector was the strongest in years.  Using the number of advertised jobs 
per new Ph.D. as a measure of the arrival rate of job offers, arrival fell 18 percent over the ten-
  2year period reported in Table 1.  The decline was most pronounced in academia (-28 percent) 
and government (-32 percent), while arrival rates rose in business.  Statistics on the job market 
for economists reported by Siegfried (2002) indicate that no market since 1996-97 was worse in 
terms of the number of new jobs per new Ph.D. recipient including that of the 2001-2002 
recession year.  Consequently, the 1996-97 market seems well characterized as a “bust” market, 
while the 1986-87 market can be characterized as a “boom”. 
  As a discipline, economics is oriented toward optimizing behavior, and so new Ph.D.s 
should adapt their search strategies to available market information.  The economics labor 
market is structured to make information on market strength easy to obtain.  The market is 
centered on the annual Allied Social Science Associations (ASSA) meetings.
2  Each fall, 
prospective Ph.D. recipients submit applications to academic institutions, government and 
international agencies, and private employers.  Information on the demand-side of the market is 
virtually costless to obtain, as most jobs are advertised in the American Economic Association’s 
publication, Job Openings for Economists (JOE).  Since the number of jobs by field and type of 
employer are known early in the market cycle, job seekers have unusually good information on 
which to base expected returns from search.  Nonetheless, their search strategies must be set by 
early December, as the great majority of interviews are conducted at the annual meetings.  The 
opportunities for sequential search are therefore quite limited.
 
  Submission of applications is not costless.  In addition to mailing costs, for example, 
there are costs associated with the time required to research employer attributes and tailor 
materials to match different employers.  Consequently, it may not be optimal to apply to every 
job, or even to apply to every job in one's field.  Instead, the applicant must decide how many 
applications to submit and what type of employers to target, based on information available 
  3about the strength of labor demand.  On the other side of the market, employers must decide how 
many people to interview and what type of applicants to pursue.  These strategies are formalized 
in the next section. 
III.    SEARCH INTENSITY IN MULTIPLE MARKETS 
Using a framework that integrates features of Fallick (1992) and Stern (1989), we show 
how a weakening labor market affects search strategies on the extensive margin (i.e., how many 
markets to sample) and on the intensive margin (i.e., how many applications to submit per 
market).  The model’s main features are summarized here, and the details of the derivations are 
included in the Appendix. 
Job Search by Applicants 
Suppose there are J employer submarkets within the market for new Ph.D.s.
3  Submarket 
j opens in the fall when   employers each decide to advertise one job vacancy with an attached 
precommited compensation level, w.  Using the announcements as information on market 
strength,   job seekers opt to search in submarket j.  Each of the seekers perceives a distribution 
of compensation packages (w) in each submarket, defined by the cumulative distribution 
function, Fj(w).  Compensation packages include salary, benefits, and teaching and research 
support.
4  Seekers also perceive the probability δj( , ) that an application will yield a job 
offer.   The arrival rate of offers, δj, is treated as a parameter by individual job seekers when they 
are deciding on applications.  It will be larger when seekers perceive that there are more job 
vacancies,  , and when they perceive that there are fewer seekers,  .  Later in the search 
process when matching occurs, employers and job seekers may adjust their strategies by entering 
j v ˆ
j n ˆ
j v ˆ j n ˆ
j v ˆ j n ˆ
  4or withdrawing, and thus the initial decisions regarding   and   may not equal their final 
realizations, vj  and nj. We will show the equilibrium conditions that set vj  and nj later. 
j v ˆ j n ˆ
Letting a rejection be viewed as a zero compensation offer, the compensation outcome 
from one application in submarket j is distributed according to 
(1)  .  (w) F δ ) δ (1 (w) G j j j j + − =
Seekers will submit Aj applications in submarket j and then select the best compensation 
package, w .  The probability that Aj applications submitted to sector j will generate an offer of 
w  is  . )] w ( [G
j A
j   The cumulative distribution function for receiving a best offer of w  across J 
submarkets is designated as  ) w ( Γ  with an associated density function,  ) w ( γ .  Their functional 
forms are given in the Appendix. 
Applications cost cj apiece.  Application costs may differ across markets in that they 
include the costs of acquiring information on the employer and a hedonic component that reflects 
the applicant's taste or distaste for the market as well as the pecuniary costs of submitting 
application materials.  For example, application costs at schools with graduate programs may be 
lower because applicants already have good information on the attributes of those schools and 
may have a preference for applying to academic institutions.
5  
Define ξ as the reservation compensation level which is the lowest compensation package 
the applicant would accept.  As shown in the Appendix, the optimum strategy is to set the 
reservation compensation level at  
(2)  ,  {} ∑ ∫
=
∞
− + − =
J
1 j
j j ξ   A c ξ Γ(w))dw (1 β ξ
which is the multimarket equivalent of the form derived by Stern (1989).  Equation (2) implies 
that seekers will set a constant reservation compensation level across all submarkets. 
  5Extensive Search 
  Extensive search involves deciding in which of the J employer submarkets to search.  The 
conditions dictating which markets a seeker will target come from the first order conditions for 





=  for all j, these J first order conditions for applications in the jth submarket are of 
the form 
(3)  J , 2, 1, j ; c (w)dw Γ(w)lnG β j ξ   j K = > − ∫
∞
. 
The left-hand side of (3) is the discounted expected marginal return from an additional 
application in submarket j and the right-hand side is the marginal cost of an application in 
submarket j.  If condition (3) is violated for all positive values of Aj, then the optimum strategy is 
to set Aj = 0, so that the applicant will decide to eliminate submarket j from his search set.  The 
nj seekers in submarket j are those for whom condition (3) is satisfied. 
There are two interesting cases under which condition (3) is violated.  One is when an 
individual's reservation compensation level is high relative to the distribution of compensation 
offers in submarket j.  The other interesting case is when δj = 0 because the individual perceives 
he cannot get an offer in submarket j.  As we argue below, the likelihood of these cases will 
differ by the quality of the seeker and by whether the labor market is in boom or bust.
  
Intensive Search 
  Search intensity is the number of applications per submarket.  The optimal search 
intensity is determined by the level of Aj that makes condition (3) hold with equality.  Our 
primary concern is to analyze how search intensity changes in response to changes in the 
strength of sectoral labor demand.  For our purposes, it is convenient to describe a bust as a 
  6decrease in the arrival rate of offers in a given sector j.
6 
7  A decline in δj will have an ambiguous 
effect on sector j applications, but will unambiguously increase applications in the other sectors 
.  That implies that the decrease in offer arrival rates in the academic and 
government sectors between 1987 and 1997 should increase search intensity outside of 
government and academia, but the effect on academic or government sector applications is 
uncertain. 
) j i 0; δ / A ( j i ≠ < ∂ ∂
Search and Seeker Quality in Boom and Bust Markets 
Applicants who signal high ability to the market, presumably those from the most 
prestigious graduate programs, will have the highest arrival rate of offers and hence, the highest 
relative ξ in both boom and bust markets.  As ξ increases, the probability that condition (3) is 
violated rises, and so high perceived ability applicants will have the highest probability of 
excluding a submarket.  This incentive for elite seekers to exclude a submarket falls in bust 
conditions as ξ declines. 
To illustrate the rationale, suppose that elite graduates search in “prestigious” submarket 
1 but not in submarket j during boom conditions.  Further, suppose that a bust occurs in 
submarket 1 such that no vacancies are announced, meaning that  = δ1 =0.  Reservation 
compensation ξ falls, and so the probability that constraint (3) is satisfied for submarket j 
increases, as does the probability that elite graduates enter submarket j.  Generalizing, we would 
expect that job seekers from top programs would search more extensively in bust than in boom 
markets. 
1 v ˆ
  In all market conditions, graduates of lower perceived quality will have lower expected 
arrival rates and thus lower reservation compensation levels than will those from elite 
institutions.  As a consequence, the inequality condition in (3) is less likely to be violated in any 
  7given submarket, thus graduates from lower ranked programs will be less likely to exclude 
markets.  The exception is that as the arrival rate δ1 of offers in prestige submarket 1 approaches 
0, G1(w) approaches 1, the left-hand-side of (3) approaches zero, and search in submarket 1 
becomes fruitless. This case is most likely to occur in bust markets as   rises relative to  .  
Consequently, lower perceived quality graduates have a higher probability of dropping out of 
prestige submarkets such as 1 during a bust. 
1 n ˆ 1 v ˆ
Search by Employers 
  Because the number of applications to submit is a choice of job seekers alone, it was 
appropriate to model the number of applications submitted with a model of one-sided search.  
However, search outcomes such as the number of interviews, site visits, or job offers will reflect 
choices of both job seekers and employers.  To evaluate search outcomes, we need to develop a 
model of two-sided search.  Before tackling the equilibrium problem, however, we need to 
describe how employer strategies will differ in boom and bust markets. 
  We assume that each employer faces a distribution of applicants in each of K supply 
submarkets.
8  For simplicity, we assume that each employer is looking to fill one job, so search 
strategies are modeled in the context of a specific job and not the firm's overall hiring strategy 
for all personnel.
9  The incumbent’s marginal revenue product, net of the precommited 
compensation level, is (qk – w), which is determined by a draw from the distribution Q(qk – w).  
Each interview in submarket k results in an accepted offer with probability θk( , ).  We 
assume initially that the employer takes this probability as parametric in setting its interview 
strategy.  θk will be higher in years when fewer employers are perceived to be competing for 
applicants (low  ) and when they perceive a higher number of seekers,  . An interview will 
k v ˆ k n ˆ
k v ˆ k n ˆ
  8generate zero net revenue with probability  . ) θ (1 k −   Hence, the distribution of returns to 
interviews in the kth submarket is 
(4)   w) -   Q(q ) (1 ) (q R k k k k k θ θ + − = .   
  Upon receipt of applications in each of the k submarkets, the employer must decide how 
many to interview and from which submarkets.  The best interviewee across all markets will 
generate  , q  the highest marginal product.  The evaluation cost is hk per applicant which can 
differ across markets.  The probability that I k interviews will generate a top offer of   
k I
k w)] -   q ( [R .  The cumulative distribution of finding a best marginal product of q across K 
submarkets is designated as  w) - q ( Ρ  with associated density function, w) -   q ( ρ .  As shown in 
the Appendix, the employer's best strategy is to set a constant net of wage reservation marginal 
revenue level, , ε  given by 
(5)  {} . 0 ) ( 1 (
1




k kI h dq w q
ε ε ε  
Equation (5) shows that the firm’s optimal strategy is to set a common reservation net of wage 
productivity level across all supply submarkets that it decides to hire from.  Workers with net 
productivity below that level will not become employed.  The remaining K first-order conditions 
set the number of interviews to set up for each market: 
(6)  K k h dq q R q k k ,..., 2 , 1 ; ) ( ln ) ( = > Ρ Β − ∫
∞
ε . 
If condition (6) is violated for all positive values of I k, the employer will avoid interviewing in 
that market.  Therefore, the number of employers opting to recruit in supply submarket k,   
will be those for whom condition (6) is satisfied for at least one interview. 
, v ˆ k
  9  We can illustrate the partial equilibrium response of an employer to a bust market as 
follows.  Suppose as before that the bust is submarket specific so that no vacancies are 
announced in prestigious employer submarket 1 ( = δ1 = 0).  By (3), seekers will 
unambiguously increase their intensive and extensive search in all other markets, implying that 
in any given submarket k, θk will increase. By (5), employers in k will respond by raising the 
minimum net productivity standard that all seekers would have to meet.  This means that either 
wages have to fall, expected productivity has to rise, or some combination of the two.  If 
employers cannot adjust the wage level from its precommited level, then the rising net 
productivity standard also means a rising absolute productivity standard, and so weaker 




  In order to make the characterization of equilibrium tractable, we need to assume that all 
of the applicants to a submarket of employers are ex ante identical.  To do this, we assume that in 
each year, the process of sorting applicants across submarkets results in a pool of applicants 
within a submarket who have an identical probability of success.  Furthermore, all employers 
within the submarket are ex ante identical in expected productivity.
11  In other words, after the 
initial announcement of vacancies and the initial receipt of applications, ex ante substandard 
applicants in terms of expected productivity are dropped by the market, as are ex ante 
substandard employers.  The remaining vk employers and nk seekers meet the ex ante quality 
standard. This process is driven by equations (3) and (5), where notional vk is substituted by true 
vk and notional nk  is substituted by true nk.  Substandard applicants find that the actual 
realization of δk  is 0, and so condition (3) is violated, prompting their withdrawl.  Substandard 
employers find that the realization of θk is 0, and so condition (5) is violated, prompting their 
  10exit. The number of qualified vacancies,   equals the number of employers for whom 
condition (5) holds and the number of qualified job seekers is the number of candidates for 
whom condition (3) holds.   
, vk
  The assumption that sorting results in ex ante identical employers and seekers 
oversimplifies the empirical context, in that the various Ph.D. submarkets undoubtedly have 
considerable heterogeneity across employers and job seekers that will affect observed outcomes.  
Nevertheless, there are some useful insights that can be extracted from the simplification. 
  A job match will occur if both the employer and the job seeker are satisfied that their 
union will generate sufficient surplus to meet each of their respective reservation requirements.  
A representative firm in submarket k requires enough productivity to pay for εk + wk, while the 
seeker requires enough to generate ξk.  The minimum acceptable match would generate exactly     
  The matching function that determines the probability of finding a successful 
match in the k
th  submarket is 
. ξ ε     q k k
m
k + =
(7)   
) , ( ) (
k k n m m
k k q u
δ Ρ =
  The function m(·) determines the number of interviews, which increases in the number of 
qualified applicants, nk, and in the arrival rate of job offers,  . /n v δ k k k =   Because all seekers in a 
submarket are ex ante identical, they will have the same probability of obtaining an interview or 
of obtaining a match, but some will land multiple offers while others come up empty.  With 
probability uk, a seeker will fail to land a match.  When an interview occurs, a draw is made on 
the revenue distribution.  The only acceptable matches will be those for which 
 which occurs with probability [1-P( )].  With m(·) interviews, the 
probability of a successful match is 1-[P( ) ]
m.
12 
, ξ ε     q q k k
m





  11  A second equation necessary for equilibrium in submarket k is the equilibrium wage 
equation, as the firm is no longer constrained to their precommited compensation package.  The 
rents from the match,  , must be divided between the employer and the worker so that 
m
k k  q q −








q q s w
ε π
ξ
+ − − =
+ − =
) )( 1 (
) (
where s is the worker’s share of the rent,  1]. [0,   s∈   If the firm can dictate pay, it will set s = 0, 
and workers will get back only their reservation wage  . ξ w k =
13  If the worker has complete 
market power, s = 1, and the firm will only be paid the value of engaging in another search 
14  . ε π k =
  The equilibrating process works as follows:  Suppose initially that   so that no 
firm would be willing to pay the reservation wage.  Employers will withdraw vacancies from the 
market.  As they do,   falls, workers will lower their reservation wages and employers will 
raise their reservation revenue level.  In the limit, vacancies will continue to be removed until 
.  When   and  , both employers and workers will expect to earn rents from 
the match.  In that case, additional seekers have an incentive to enter and more employers will 
have an incentive to offer vacancies. 
m
k k q q <
k δ
m
k k q q = k k ξ ε < 1 δ <
Equilibrium Sorting in Boom and Bust Markets 
  Our concern is limited to the question of how employers and job seekers respond to a 
decrease in labor demand.  A complete analysis of the properties of the model is beyond the 
scope of this paper, although it would be possible using simulation methods.  We begin as 
before, supposing that the bust occurs in the relatively prestigious submarket 1 so that v1 =0.  
Both high and low ability job seekers will lower their reservation wages across all submarkets 
including the less prestigious submarket k.  The resulting rise in θk  will cause employers in k to 
  12raise their reservation net productivity level εk.   The minimum acceptable match productivity 
level may not change however, as the increase in εk is accompanied by the decline in ξk, leading 
to an ambiguous change in .  k k
m
k ξ ε     q + =
  The downward sorting of high quality seekers into submarket k creates difficulties for the 
lower quality seekers normally in k.  Because the sorting leads to ex ante homogeneous job 
seekers in k, the increase in expected quality will cause ex ante lesser quality applicants to drop 
out of k as for them, δk drops to zero in the bust. 
  The bust will induce an increase in search intensity in k, and so nk rises.  The matching 
function increases in nk but decreases in  and so the impact of the bust on the probability 
of matches (interviews, site visits and job offers) is uncertain.  Consequently, the probability that 
a seeker in k will search unsuccessfully in k may rise or fall in the bust. 
, /n v k k
  Similarly, using (8), we cannot predict if wages in k will rise or fall.  There are two 
reasons.  First, the average quality of applicants in k rises, so the match rent   may rise, 
even if the minimum acceptable match productivity   rises.  Consequently, there may be more 
surplus to distribute between the employer and the worker.  Second, while the reservation wage 
for all seekers falls, the seekers in submarket k during the bust are not the same seekers in 
submarket k in the boom period.  It is possible that the reservation wages for high quality seekers 
in the bust are higher than the reservation wages for low quality seekers in k during the boom.  In 
fact, average starting salaries in the Ph.D. economics market do not seem to fall in bust periods, 
presumably due to some combination of sorting on quality and rising match capital in the bust 
market. 
m
k k  q q −
m
k q
  What then helps the lower quality applicants in bust markets who have been displaced 
from submarket k?  There is a residual employer submarket R that does not bother seeking Ph.D. 
  13economists in boom conditions because condition (3) is violated for all job seekers at all 
application levels.  With nR = 0 and θR= 0, condition (6) will be violated at any positive level of 
interviews, and so employers in submarket R would not pursue applicants from submarket R in 
the boom.  In the bust market, the decrease in ξR for seekers in R increases the likelihood that 
condition (3) is satisfied, raising the probability that nR > 0, that θR > 0, and that condition (6) is 
satisfied for employers in submarket R.  Consequently, some employers interview in the Ph.D. 
market only in bust conditions. 
  At the risk of caricaturing the market, the prestige employer submarket in our empirical 
application might include highly-ranked Ph.D. granting institutions.  An example of less 
prestigious submarket k would be liberal arts colleges with heavy teaching loads or lower-tier 
Ph.D. granting institutions.  An example of submarket R could be state and local governments or 
small private employers that normally do not seek to employ Ph.D. economists. Our theory 
suggests that when there is a bust in the prestige Ph.D. granting market, higher quality applicants 
will shift into less prestigious markets such as teaching colleges or lower tier Ph.D. granting 
institutions, potentially displacing lower quality applicants.  Meanwhile, employers who do not 
normally hire large numbers of Ph.D. economists such as private employers or state agencies 
may enter the market to take advantage of the opportunity to hire Ph.D. economists from lower 
ranked schools.  The main predictions of the theory and our empirical findings are summarized 
in Table 2. 
IV. DATA   
As discussed previously, Table 1 shows that the U.S. labor market for new Ph.D. 
economists was relatively strong in 1987 and relatively weak in 1997.  To examine how search 
  14strategies and outcomes differ across these markets, we surveyed new Ph.D.s in 1987 and 1997 
utilizing the same survey instrument in each year. 
The 1987 survey was based on the summary listings of new Ph.D.s provided annually by 
the placement directors at Ph.D. granting economics departments.  In March 1987, placement 
directors at 70 of the then top 92 ranked Ph.D. programs received a packet of questionnaires to 
distribute to their students who had entered the Ph.D. market.  In total, 308 of the surveys were 
returned with no apparent relationship between institution quality and the response rate.
15  Of 
those, 294 had responses that were sufficiently complete to use for this study. 
The 1997 survey was administered to first-time job seekers at the ASSA meetings in New 
Orleans, LA (January 2-5, 1997).  Individuals were approached at the meetings and asked to 
participate.  If they agreed, the monitor briefly explained the survey and solicited responses from 
the participant.  This procedure provided 193 completed surveys.  Although the universe of the 
two samples differs, in practice the two samples are similar in that 96 percent of the 1987 
respondents attended the ASSA meetings that year, which also happened to be in New Orleans.
16 
Our surveys solicited responses on applicant characteristics, search strategies, and 
success at the ASSA meetings.  Similar to recent studies (e.g., Barbazet (1992), Broder (1993), 
Formby et al. (1993), Singell and Stone (1993), Kahn (1995), and Siegfried and Stock (1999)), 
applicant characteristics include such factors as age, resident status, gender, graduate institution, 
whether the candidate has published, and whether the candidate obtained a scholarship to help 
defray his/her graduate education expenditures.  Search strategy questions deal with whether or 
not the candidate excluded from search any jobs (on the basis of location or type of job) and 
number of applications submitted to different job-types.  The number of interviews obtained at 
  15the ASSA meetings, the number of on-site visits and the number of job offers are measures of 
successful search.
17  Table 3 provides empirical definitions of the key variables. 
Applicant characteristics across the two market years are reported at the top of Table 4.  
The age of first-time Ph.D. recipients grew by 2.2 years on average from 1987 to 1997.  The 
proportion of job seekers that are nonresidents rose, as did the proportion with publications at the 
time of the meetings.  The proportion of men among job seekers increased 1 percentage point 
while the proportion on scholarship increased 2 percentage points from 1987 to 1997.  These 
trends correspond well to the trends in available data on earned doctorates reported in Siegfried 
and Stock (1999), with the exception that respondents to the surveys are slightly more likely to 
be female and U.S. residents than the population of Ph.D. recipients as a whole. 
V.  SEARCH STRATEGIES FOR APPLICANTS 
Our data on the number of applications submitted by submarket reflect supply-side search 
strategies only, given seeker perceptions of the strength of labor demand.  Our theoretical model 
suggests that as labor market demand weakens, reservation wages should fall and the incentives 
to exclude a given market should decrease.  Because those from premier institutions (Tier 1) 
would have the greatest incentive to exclude sectors when demand is strong, we should find the 
greatest increase in extensive search among elite graduates during a bust market.  The results in 
Table 4 support this premise:  Tier 1 graduates were more likely to exclude sectors in the 
stronger 1987 market compared to the weaker 1997 market.  Indeed, for Tier 1 graduates, the 
exclusion probability fell in every submarket except one.  Elite graduates were significantly less 
likely to exclude a region of the country, state or local government jobs, private employers, 
research institutes, international agencies, and schools that require more teaching.  Furthermore, 
graduates of second- and third-tier programs also generally chose less exclusive search strategies 
  16in 1997 relative to 1987, with the changes often smaller numerically and not significantly 
different from zero.
18 The theory also raises the possibility that weaker applicants would exclude 
prestige markets in a bust as δj approaches 0.  There is modest evidence that Tier 3 graduates 
were more likely to opt out of undergraduate and graduate academic submarkets in the bust, 
although the change is small and not statistically significant. 
Search strategies also include decisions on the number of applications to submit to 
different types of jobs.  As the arrival rate of offers drops in the academic and government 
submarkets, search intensity should increase in the business sector.
19  This conjecture is 
confirmed by the data, as the number of business applications increases significantly in each of 
the tiers.
20 
Differences in unconditional means across 1987 and 1997 could be due to changes in 
applicant characteristics over time.  To control for temporal discrepancies in applicant 
characteristics, we report a comparative static estimate, taken as the estimated coefficient on a 
dummy variable for 1997, holding constant age, resident status, male, publication, scholarship, 
and tier ranking of graduate program, in the final column of the bottom portion of Table 4.  In all 
cases, the probability of excluding a market fell as the overall labor market weakened from 1987 
to 1997.  Furthermore, over the same time frame, the comparative static estimates indicate that 
business sector applications increased by 4.8, which is consistent with the predicted search 
intensity response. 
Theory does not generate an unambiguous prediction of how weakening demand in 
academia and government affects search intensity in those sectors.  Yet, if we take the numbers 
literally, graduates of top-tier schools appear to search more intensively in the academic sector as 
the academic market weakens, most noticeably by applying to undergraduate colleges and full-
  17time teaching jobs that they would have avoided in the boom.  Graduates of third tier institutions 
reduced their academic applications and shifted in dramatic fashion toward business applications. 
Interestingly, the average search intensity by sector for top-tier graduates in the 1997 bust 
market is similar to the search intensity of third-tier graduates in the 1987 boom market.  Also, 
the exclusion strategies of first-tier graduates in 1997 are similar to those of third-tier graduates 
in 1987.  In short, graduates of stronger programs search in weak markets much as graduates of 
weaker programs search in strong markets.  This suggests that as the market weakens, stronger 
applicants shift their sights toward less prestigious outlets that were previously left to weaker 
applicants, displacing third tier graduates from their normal markets.  The third tier graduates 
then seek submarkets that open because of the bust conditions in the prestige markets. 
VI.  SEARCH OUTCOMES  
Search outcomes including the number of interviews, site visits and job offers are the 
result of the matching process between employers and seekers. The theory does not generate 
sharp predictions on the probability of success in the bust, but it does predict that employers 
would be raising the minimum quality level, potentially limiting opportunities for lower quality 
graduates in the more prestigious submarkets.  At the same time, some employers that avoid the 
Ph.D. market in a boom enter in a bust market, providing a new source of employment for lower 
quality seekers.  We focus on three sequential indicators of successful search in the primary 
market centered on the ASSA meetings:  1) initial interviews at the meetings; 2) site visits; and 
3) job offers. 
Summary statistics on search outcome for the three submarkets are presented in Table 5.  
Applicants in 1997 had less success on average, as the average number of interviews, visits, and 
offers were significantly lower in 1997 versus 1987 for graduates of all tiers.  The exception is 
  18the business submarket, where success probabilities were roughly comparable in 1997 and 1987.  
Our conjecture about employer and applicant search strategies does appear consistent with the 
data.  The ratio of Tier 1 to Tier 3 academic interviews rises from 1.5 to 1 in 1986-87 to 2.4 to 1 
in 1996-97 indicating that Tier 3 applicants are being atypically sorted out of the weakening 
academic market. 
Furthermore, with respect to the academic submarket, graduates of the top two tiers 
averaged more than one academic offer in 1987, yet only 0.7 offers in 1997.  Indeed, top-tier 
graduates received academic offers in the bust market at nearly identical rates to third-tier 
graduates in boom markets, consistent with the earlier finding that top-tier candidates in 1997 
used search strategies that were similar to Tier 3 job seekers in 1987. 
All tiers had significantly less success in the government submarket in 1997.  
Government success rates for top-tier graduates dropped so much that they were 
indistinguishable from those of third-tier graduates. 
The business sector took up the slack in the market.  The top tier graduates experienced 
no decline in average offers in the business sector, and lower tier graduates had rising average 
numbers of site visits and offers in 1997. 
Outcomes Conditional on Job Seeker Attributes 
Table 5 estimates do not control for important factors such as gender, age, and applicant 
quality that may affect search outcomes between the two years.  As the market goes from boom 
to bust, employers will raise their hiring standards.  This subsection examines how the matching 
process, measured by the number of interviews, site visits and offers, changes from boom to bust 
markets. 
  19Referring once more to equation (7), matches can be measured by their number, m, or by 
the probability of success, 1-[P( )]
m.  We opted to concentrate on the number of matches, m, 
as it provides additional heterogeneity in outcomes to explain.  It also avoids complications 
associated with possible variation in the threshold output level,  across employers that we 
cannot control as our data set does not identify the attributes of the employers.  We require an 
econometric specification that can accommodate the count nature of our match success 
indicators.  Let mij be the number of matches for job seeker i in submarket j, and Xi be the 
seeker’s demographic and productive characteristics.  A convenient option is the negative 
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where lnλi = β Xi,  mij and Xi are as defined above, β  is a vector of estimable parameters, and 
where exp(u) has a gamma distribution with mean 1 and variance α.  If α = 0, (9) reduces to the 
Poisson regression.  In our applications, the restriction that α = 0 was rejected in all 
specifications, so we report only results from the negative binomial specification. 
′
Table 6 presents the estimation results for interviews in the academic, business, and 
government submarkets.  We could not reject the hypothesis that the coefficients were equal 
across tiers, and so we report only the regressions that pool across tiers.  However, the null 
hypotheses that the coefficients were equal across submarkets or equal across boom and bust 
periods were easily rejected.  Thus, we estimate the model for each submarket and time period 
separately. 
The first two columns of Table 6 report the impact of demographic and qualification 
variables on the number of academic interviews.  The coefficients are monotonically related to 
  20the predicted number of interviews so that positive signs imply more interviews.  The marginal 
impact of a change in Xi on the incidence rate of interviews is given by   In 
comparisons across the boom (1987) and bust (1997) years, a decrease in the magnitude of the 
coefficient would suggest a decrease in the arrival rate of interview matches associated with a 
weakening academic labor market. 
). ∆X exp(β i i
Men have a significant disadvantage in getting academic interviews compared to 
observationally identical women.  The male disadvantage increases significantly in the bust 
market.   The coefficients imply that male interview arrival rates were 18 percent less than 
otherwise comparable female seekers in the boom.  In the bust, the disadvantage increases to a 
41 percent lower arrival rate of interviews.  Older applicants obtain fewer interviews, but the 
impact is small numerically.  The disadvantage lessened in the bust market, but the numerical 
difference is insignificant.  Residents had a small and statistically insignificant advantage in the 
bust market, a reversal from the boom. 
Our theory suggested that academic employers will raise hiring standards and concentrate 
on elite school graduates in a bust market.  This appears to be the case, with sharp increases in 
the arrival rate of academic interviews for Tier 1 and Tier 2 applicants relative to those from less 
prestigious programs.  However, the advantage of having a publication or scholarship 
disappeared in the bust market, as the respective estimated coefficients are not significantly 
different from zero.
21  
In general, seeker attributes associated with a decline in relative academic interview 
matches were associated with stronger arrival rates of business interviews.  Men were more than 
twice as likely to land business interviews in the bust market after having a modestly lower 
interview arrival rate in the boom.  In the bust market, Tier 3 graduates who were losing 
  21relatively in the academic market had an increased probability of landing interview matches in 
business. 
The government sector barely participated in the 1997 market in terms of offers.  The 
number of interviews held was just over half the number of business interviews, almost an exact 
reversal of the relative position of the two submarkets in the 1987 boom.  In both boom and bust 
markets, resident status is critical for an interview match in the government sector, reflecting 
hiring restrictions on foreign nationals.  The other attributes show evidence of sorting.  The Tier 
3 disadvantage in interview matches in the bust academic market is also reversed in the 
government market.  Likewise, men who lost relative position in the academic market faced a 
higher arrival rate of interview matches in the government sector. 
Across the three subgroups, the story from Table 6 appears to be that when the labor 
market weakens for doctorates in economics, the graduates of elite institutions and women gain 
market share of interviews in the academic market.  Graduates of lesser institutions and male 
seekers get crowded into other markets, gaining market share of interviews there. 
Visits and Offers 
We replicate the specification for our two other measures of matches, site visits and 
offers, in Table 7.  For two main reasons, we confine our discussion to the academic market.  
First, because the academic market closes by the end of the academic year, our results for that 
market are relatively complete.  The other markets continue through the summer, and we do not 
observe decisions that late into the year.  Second, in part due to that problem, our site visit and 
offer measures in the government sectors are dominated by a preponderance of zeroes, and so the 
formal test of the hypothesis of equal coefficients across boom and bust markets could not be 
rejected in those markets because of a preponderance of imprecisely estimated coefficients.  
  22However, the sign patterns for visits and offers in those submarkets matched their respective 
signs in the interview regressions reported in Table 6. Consequently, similar patterns of matching 
across boom and bust markets appear to hold across all three search outcomes.
22  
Because the regressions for site visits and offers tell similar stories, we will discuss both 
pairs of estimates simultaneously.  In both boom and bust markets, men experience significantly 
greater difficulty obtaining visits and offers compared to otherwise comparable women, and the 
percentage decline in arrival rates is greatest for offers (-62%) than site visits (-51%) or 
interviews (-41%).  However, men make up the gap in the business submarket.  Residents, who 
had a small match advantage in terms of interviews in the bust market, have a significantly 
improved match probability in academic site visits and offers.  Nonresidents make up the gap 
only partially in the business market in that the resident advantage in that market shrinks in size 
and becomes insignificant. 
  The top-tier graduates continue to enjoy an advantage in academic site visits and offers in 
the bust market, but the coefficients fall in magnitude and precision.  This is consistent with the 
results in Table 4 where elite graduates retain their advantage in academic market outcomes in 
the bust market, but they face the greatest proportional decrease in visits and offers compared to 
their boom market levels.  The peculiar disadvantage for publications found for interviews in the 
bust academic market follows through to site visits and offers, although the precision of the 
estimate is suspect. 
  Compared to the results for interviews in Table 6, the results in Table 7 reveal less 
crowding out of the academic market on the basis of quality.  The difference reflects the fact that 
elite graduates in boom markets average multiple site visits and offers, whereas third tier 
graduates average less than a single academic offer in the boom.  In the bust, third-tier applicants 
  23do still less well, but the largest decline in matches during the bust is for the first tier graduates 
who, on average, have gone from multiple offers to less than one. 
  Those graduates who were not matched in the academic market generally find 
employment in other submarkets, even in the bust market of 1997 (Siegfried and Stock, 1999).  
As discussed above, they found that elite graduates were more likely to find employment in the 
academic market and to be satisfied with the job they found.  Their findings are consistent with 
our result that tier 3 seekers get crowded out of favored submarkets in the bust and end up 
searching in submarkets they may not have expected to enter. 
VII. CONCLUDING  REMARKS 
  This paper shows the importance of job market conditions on the search strategies and 
outcomes for first-time job seekers in the economics Ph.D. labor market, both in theory and in 
the data.  In bust markets, graduates at all quality tier levels are less likely to exclude markets.  
However, the changes are most noticeable for elite graduates who search more intensively at 
weaker academic institutions.  Employers raise hiring standards in bust markets, which means 
that weaker schools concentrate more intensively on graduates from higher-ranked schools.  This 
serves to crowd graduates from lower-tier schools into less favored sectors such as business. 
Left unexplored is whether graduates who are crowded out of their favored markets 
during the bust ultimately reenter the market to seek a more favorable match later in their 
careers.  If so, we should find more job switching for bust year graduates than for boom year 
graduates.  On the other hand, those placed in the academic market during bust years should be 
atypically productive as they had to meet a higher hiring standard in order to be employed.  This 
would be particularly true for men and for nonresidents hired in bust years who seemingly faced 
greater difficulty being matched in the bust market relative to otherwise comparable women and 
  24residents.  If this reflects a tendency to set higher threshold hiring levels for men and 
nonresidents, then we would expect that men and nonresident academicians hired in bust years to 
be even more productive on average.
23  These questions could be explored with longitudinal data 
on the careers of boom and bust graduates.
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1 The “1987 market” coincides with the 1986-87 academic year and the “1997 market” 
coincides with the 1996-97 academic year. 
2 Readers are encouraged to see Carson and Navarro’s (1988) and Cawley's (2002) 
descriptions of the Ph.D. economics market.  Similar to these two studies, since we are limiting 
the analysis to positions that are predominantly filled via the ASSA meetings, rather than 
speaking of the global market for Ph.D.s, which includes clearing mechanisms outside the U.S., 
our analysis is of a more narrow market, defined by individuals who attend the ASSA meetings. 
 
3 Examples of academic employer submarkets would include elite graduate programs; 
lower tier graduate programs; and liberal arts colleges.  Examples of nonacademic employer 
submarkets would be the government sector; private employers; and international agencies. 
4 We could also include the hedonic value of the job as part of the compensation package, 
but felt it more natural to incorporate only pecuniary elements in w.  Instead, we incorporate 
taste elements (quality of potential colleagues, prestige of the employer) as an element of the cost 
of search in each market.    
5 Siegfried and Stock (1999) reported that new Ph.D.s who ended up in business positions 
were most likely to report their job was a mismatch with their training and inconsistent with their 
original plans.  We take this as indirect evidence supporting our presumption that the academic 
market is the preferred submarket for new Ph.D.s.   
6 We could also have characterized a bust market as a decline in the mean of the offer 
distribution, rather than a decline in the offer rate.  It turns out that signs of the comparative static 
effects for a decline in the mean of the offer distribution are the same as those with respect to δj.  
It should be noted that the real average pay for new Ph.D.s did not decline between 1987 and 
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1997, despite the weak academic markets of the mid 1990s.   
 
7 Later, it will be convenient for us to assume that submarket j is a prestige market that 
would attract elite applicants, but it is important to note that weakness in any submarket j will 
increase incentives to apply in other submarkets.   
 
8 Examples of supply submarkets are the elite graduates of elite programs; other graduates 
of tier 1 and top graduates of tier 2 programs; and other graduates. 
9 We do not have any information on employers directly, so our information on the job is 
restricted to that obtained from the survey of applicants.  A richer model could embed the firm's 
search strategy for new Ph.D. economists in the context of their complementarity or 
substitutability with other types of employees.  Examples would include tradeoffs between hiring 
economists versus MBAs, temporary instructors, accountants, public policy school graduates, or 
finance Ph.D.s.  
 
10 This leaves open the possibility that a firm may have several different wages for the 
same job, depending on the expected productivity of each seeker.  Legal and internal labor 
market restriction on that practice may force employers to offer the same wage to all seekers, so 
that (5) prevents low quality seekers from gaining employment by accepting a lower wage.  Later 
on, we will have to assume that all seekers in a given submarket have the same productivity ex 
ante, so there will be a single offered wage. 
11 To our knowledge, there are no existing equilibrium search models that allow multiple 
sectors, multiple applicants per job, and ex ante heterogeneity among searches and employers. 
 
12 In essence, substandard employers are those for whom all draws on qk would fail to 




  27 
). 0 εk
 
13 Note that because we take random draws from the distribution of qk, there will be 
heterogeneity in wage outcomes, even if expected wages are equal across seekers ex ante. 
14 Pissarides (2000) model assumes that employers can continue hiring until expected 
returns from an additional search is driven to zero( =   That condition is unlikely to hold in 
our application because employers generally cannot add additional Ph.D. vacancies within a 
year.  In multiple year settings, it would make sense to impose the zero expected profit condition. 
15 Five schools refused to distribute the survey, with no apparent relationship between 
school rank and willingness to cooperate. 
16 We replicated our results deleting those 11 job seekers who did not attend the ASSA 
meetings in 1987.  Results were not sensitive to their inclusion or deletion, so we used the larger 
sample.  
17 For the 1987 survey, interview, visit, and offer counts were obtained from the initial 
survey; whereas for the 1997 survey, interview, visit, and offer counts were obtained via a 
follow-up e-mail survey.  
18 Several individuals graduated from programs ranked below the top 100 (Tier 4).  While 
their search strategies also differed between 1987 and 1997, due to the small sample size in 1987, 
we exclude this group from Table 3.  We estimated all of our regressions with and without this 
group.  Since the results were largely insensitive to the inclusion of Tier 4, favoring degrees of 
freedom we included these individuals in all regressions.  Descriptive statistics for Tier 4 
individuals are available upon request. 
19 To make the subsectors large enough to evaluate, we include Banking or finance, 
Business or industry, and Consulting or research under our aggregated Business group. There 
was little change in the importance of these subcomponents between the two years.  
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Consulting/research institutes made up 67% of the market in 1987 and 60% in 1997.   
20 Although there was little change between 1987 and 1997 in the percentage of 
respondents that applied for academic jobs (i.e., 95% applied for academic jobs in 1987, while 
96% applied in 1997), as well as government jobs (i.e., 56% in 1987 and 47% in 1997), the 
percentage of respondents applying to business jobs increased from 39% to 62%.   
21 One could rationalize the drop in importance of self-reported publications as an 
indication of the proliferation of low quality journals, but we have no information on the quality 
of the publications.  The sharp increase in the proportion reporting publications in the bust 
market suggests that the definition of  "publication" differed across the two markets. 
22 Note that our interview information in the business and government sectors will be less 
subject to truncation than are our site visit and offer measures, and so our interview regressions 
will be subject to less measurement error. 
 
23 This also demonstrates why studies of discrimination that look only at those in the 
academic market can yield invalid inferences.  Suppose, for example, that women face 
discrimination in the business sector.  This will cause women to lower their reservation wages 
across all markets relative to men.  It will also cause women to search more intensively in sectors 
other than business.  Other things equal, more women will be matched in the academic market 
than men, but with their lower reservation wages, women are likely to end up being paid less on 
average than men.  An earnings function estimated in the academic market will find that women 
are paid less than men, but the source of the discrimination is in the business sector and not in 
academia. 
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Table 1.  Supply and Demand for U.S. Economics Ph.D. Graduates
a 
     
Job Listings  Academic 
Year 
Ph.D. 
Recipients  Academic Government  Business  Total 
                  
1986-87 750  1193 (1.59)  167 (0.22)  274 (0.37)  1673 (2.23) 
1987-88  770  1284 (1.67)  241 (0.31)  333 (0.43)  1887 (2.45) 
1988-89  827  1383 (1.67)  196 (0.24)  360 (0.44)  1959 (2.37) 
1989-90  806  1444 (1.79)  195 (0.24)  357 (0.44)  2018 (2.50) 
1990-91  802  1296 (1.62)  121 (0.15)  237 (0.30)  1695 (2.11) 
1991-92  866  1056 (1.22)  140 (0.16)  332 (0.38)  1549 (1.79) 
1992-93  879  1018 (1.02)  98 (0.11)  235 (0.27)  1372 (1.56) 
1993-94  869  1108 (1.28)  72 (0.08)  261 (0.30)  1457 (1.68) 
1994-95  910  1080 (1.19)  117 (0.13)  242 (0.27)  1467 (1.61) 
1995-96  1008  1038 (1.03)  62 (0.06)  316 (0.31)  1446 (1.43) 
1996-97 950  1083  (1.14)  143  (0.15)  479  (0.50)  1737 (1.83) 
              
  27%↑ 9%↓ (28%)↓ 14%↓ (32%)↓ 75%↑ (35%)↑ 4%↑ (18%)↓ 
 
a Data on numbers of new Ph.D. recipients came from the National Research Council and Siegfried and Stock 
(1999).  Data on job listings were compiled from U.S. jobs listed in the American Economic Association's  (AEA) 
Job Openings for Economists.  Foreign jobs were excluded.  Academic job listings include two-year and four-year 
colleges and universities.  Government job listings include Federal, state, and local agencies.  Business job listings 
include private sector employers in banking, finance and industry, consulting firms and research institutes.  AEA 
jobs listed as  "other" were not included in our aggregations for Academic, Government or Business jobs, so the 
total numbers are not the sum of the first three columns.   "Other" jobs are a small proportion of the total (i.e., 2.33% 
of the total in 1986-87 and 1.84% in 1996-97).  Job listings per new Ph.D. recipient are provided in parentheses.     
 
  32Table 2.  Summary of Predictions and Findings Regarding the Impact of Bust Submarkets on Search Strategies and Outcomes 
 
 
In a bust, we expect 
•  Extensive Search 
o  Elite seekers will search in more, less prestigious submarkets 
o  Low-tier seekers will drop more prestigious submarkets 
 
•  Intensive Search 
o  All seekers will submit more applications in nonbust submarkets 
o  Uncertain effect on applications in bust (academic) submarket 
o  Uncertain effect on total applications 
 
•  Matches (Interviews, Site Visits, Offers) 
o  Matches in bust submarkets decrease 
o  Matches in nonbust submarkets will increase 









Elite seekers submit more, low-tier seekers submit fewer 
All seekers submit more 
 
 
Confirmed, but definitional 
Confirmed, especially for low-tier site and offers 
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Table 3.  Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
  
Age  Age of individual 
Resident  1 if citizen or permanent resident of U.S., 0 if not 
Male  1 if male, 0 if not 
Publication  1 if individual has a publication, 0 if not 
Scholarship  1 if individual has a scholarship or assistantship, 0 if not 
Tier 1  1 if individual from top 19 Ph.D. program, 0 if not
a 
Tier 2  1 if individual from Ph.D. program ranked 20-49, 0 if not
a 
Tier 3  1 if individual from Ph.D. program ranked 50-100, 0 if not
a 
Region  1 if individual excluded from search any region, 0 if not 
Town<10K  1 if individual excluded from search cities with populations less than 10,000, 0 if not 
Federal  1 if individual excluded from search federal government jobs, 0 if not 
State/Local  1 if individual excluded from search state or local government jobs, 0 if not 
Private Employers  1 if individual excluded from search industry/business jobs, 0 if not 
Research Institute  1 if individual excluded from search research institute jobs, 0 if not 
International Agency  1 if individual excluded from search international agency jobs, 0 if not 
Undergraduate  1 if individual excluded from search undergraduate institutions, 0 if not 
Graduate  1 if individual excluded from search graduate institutions, 0 if not 
Full-time Teaching  1 if individual excluded from search full time teaching institutions, 0 if not 
Academic  Number of academic applications submitted by individual 
Business  Number of industry/business applications submitted by individual 
Government  Number of government applications submitted by individual 
 
aRankings of institutions obtained from Scott and Mitias (1996).  The top 19 schools are Harvard, Chicago, Penn, 
MIT, Northwestern, Stanford, Princeton, Michigan, Berkeley, UCLA, Yale, Columbia, NYU, Rochester, Wisconsin, 
Carnegie-Mellon, Cornell, Duke, and Illinois, respectively. 
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Table 4.  Sample Statistics 
          
   Means











              
Age    29.5   31.7   5.1
*    
Resident    0.75   0.63   -2.8
*    
Male    0.72   0.73   0.2     
Publication    0.25   0.42   3.7
*    
Scholarship    0.80   0.82   0.5     
                  






































          
            
Region 0.48  0.29  -2.2
**  0.41 0.33 -0.9 0.41 0.23 -1.5  -0.39
* 
Town<10K  0.27 0.24 -0.4  0.22 0.28  0.7 0.22 0.10 -1.3  -0.02 
Federal  0.35 0.32 -0.3  0.36 0.38  0.2 0.30 0.20 -0.9  -0.36
** 
State/Local 0.73  0.49  -2.6
* 0.60 0.58 -0.2 0.52 0.13 -3.5
* -0.60
* 
Private Employers  0.52  0.17  -4.5
* 0.42 0.40 -0.2 0.33 0.18 -1.4  -0.62
* 
Research Institute  0.42  0.15  -3.5
* 0.31 0.33  0.2 0.37 0.08 -2.8
* -0.58
* 
International Agency  0.49  0.22  -3.2
* 0.52 0.35 -1.9
*** 0.48  0.30  -1.5  -0.57
* 
Undergraduate 0.20  0.07  -2.3
**  0.12 0.08 -0.7 0.11 0.13  0.2  -0.26 
Graduate  0.02 0.02 0.1  0.05 0.00 -2.3
** 0.11  0.15  0.5  -0.11 
Full-Time Teaching  0.52  0.22  -3.6
* 0.32 0.23 -1.1 0.22 0.13 -0.9  -0.43
* 
                
Applications:                 
                
Academic  37.0 42.0 0.8  49.0 49.5  0.1 43.2 35.0 -1.2  -5.51 
Business 2.4  4.7  1.8
*** 2.6  5.7  1.9
*** 1.3 17.7  2.7
* 4.78
* 
Government 2.4  2.3  -0.2  2.8  2.4  -0.5 2.5 4.3 1.2  -0.38 
 
a Numbers in parentheses refer to the respective sample size.  Note that the sum of the sample sizes for Tiers 1 through
3 fall short of the totals for each year.  The discrepancy is accounted by individuals who graduated from institutions  
below the top 100. 
b Test of difference in means. 
c Coefficient of dummy variable for 1997 (=1 for 1997, 0 for 1987) from probit or OLS regression, holding constant 
age, residency, gender, publications, scholarship, and tier rank of Ph.D. granting institution.  Complete results are 
available upon request. 
* Significant at 1% level. 
** Significant at 5% level. 
*** Significant at 10% level. 
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Table 5:  Job Search Outcomes Per Ph.D. Recipient, by Type of Outcome and Quality of 
Graduate Program, 1987 and 1997  
 Academic    Business    Government 
Variable  1987 1997    1987 1997   1987  1997 
             
Overall Job Search Outcomes             
             
INTERVIEWS 11.98
a  4.87










a   0.15  0.16   0.35
a 0.06
a 
               
Tier 1 Job Search Outcomes               
               
INTERVIEWS 13.16
a 7.32










a   0.20  0.20   0.42
a 0.05
a 
               
Tier 2 Job Search Outcomes               
               
INTERVIEWS 10.91
a 5.85










a   0.08  0.23   0.25
a 0.08
a 
               
Tier 3 Job Search Outcomes               
               
INTERVIEWS 8.70
a 3.08
a   0.37
a 1.35
a   1.15
a 0.43
a 
VISITS  1.15  0.90   0.11  0.38   0.22  0.05 
OFFERS  0.74  0.53   0.11  0.18   0.30
a 0.05
a 
               
a  Significant (at least 10%) difference between means for 1987 and 1997. 
  
Table 6.  Determinants of Interview Counts:  Academic, Business and Government Submarkets
a,b 
 Academic




 d  1987
d  1997
 d   1987
 d 1997
 d 
               
Constant 3.37
*  2.43
*   0.59
c 2.23
**c   -0.33  -2.39 
 (7.92)  (4.51)    (0.50)  (2.03)   (1.44) (2.07) 
Demographics               
Male -0.20
**c -0.53
*c   -0.06 0.78
**   0.04  0.58
*** 
 (2.07)  (3.16)    (0.23) (2.05)   (0.2)  (1.66) 
               
Age -0.04
* -0.03
***   -0.08
** -0.09
*   -0.08
* -0.03 
 (3.30)  (1.70)    (2.39)  (2.70)   (3.00) (1.17) 
               
Resident -0.10  0.12    0.60
** 0.12   2.90
* 3.39
* 
 (0.99)  (0.71)    (2.07) (0.35)   (7.5)  (4.58) 
               
Individual Qualifications               
Tier 1  0.28
** c 0.69
* c  0.98
**c -0.43
c   0.47
** 0.02 
 (2.01)  (3.61)    (2.15)  (1.01)   (1.56) (0.05) 
               
Tier 2  0.19  0.48
**   1.09
***c -0.57
c   0.39  -0.12 
 (1.26)  (2.45)    (2.31)  (1.28)   (1.24) (0.33) 
               
               
Publication 0.28
* c -0.10
 c   0.21  -0.13    -0.15
*** -0.30 
 (2.86)  (0.61)    (0.80)  (0.35)   (0.74) (0.99) 
               
Scholarship 0.28
**  0.01   0.27 -0.19   0.02
 c -0.72
** c 
 (2.57)  (0.03)    (0.92)  (0.44)   (0.10) (2.17) 
               
Log Likelihood      -999      -502        -350  -227        -452        -153 
Sample Size       294        193         294   193         294         193 
a Dependent variable is number of interviews.  Estimates are from the negative binomial regression estimator. 
b  t-statistics are in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. 
 c Test of the difference in coefficient estimates for the variable between 1987 and 1997 (10% significance 
level).  
d  Joint test of the difference in all coefficient estimates between 1987 and 1997 (10% significance level). 
* Significant at 1% level. 
** Significant at 5% level. 
*** Significant at 10% level. 
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Table 7.  Determinants of Site Visits and Job Offers in the Academic Submarket
a,b 
 
Site Visits    Job Offers 
Variable 1987
 d 1997
 d  1987
d  1997
 d 
         
Constant 1.28
**  2.38
*   1.42
**c 1.85
**c  
 (2.12)  (3.53)    (2.14) (2.35)   
Demographics          
Male -0.31
**c -0.71
*c   -0.37
*c -0.97
*c  
 (2.44)  (3.76)    (2.72) (4.68)   
          
Age -0.04
** -0.06
*   -0.06
* -0.07
*  
 (2.28)  (3.06)    (2.88) (3.13)   
          
Resident -0.24
***c 0.49
**c   -0.49
**c 0.81
*c  
 (1.81)  (2.45)    (3.52) (3.30)   
          
Individual Qualifications          
Tier 1  1.10
* c 0.38
*** c  0.95
* 0.35   
 (5.09)  (1.73)    (3.81) (1.40)   
          
Tier 2  0.72
*  0.30    0.71
* 0.14   
 (3.15)  (1.32)    (2.73) (0.55)   
          
          
Publication 0.51
* c -0.34
***c   0.52
*c -0.20
c  
 (3.94)  (1.77)    (3.84) (0.91)   
          
Scholarship 0.39
** c -0.25
c   0.34
** -0.07   
 (2.50)  (1.08)    (2.00) (0.27)   
         
Log Likelihood      -631      -275        -473  -183 
Sample Size       294        193         294   193   
a Dependent variable is number of academic visits and offers.  Estimates are from the 
negative binomial regression estimator. 
b  t-statistics are in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. 
 c Test of the difference in coefficient estimates for the variable between 1987 and 
1997 (10% significance level).  
d  Joint test of the difference in all coefficient estimates between 1987 and 1997 
(10% significance level). 
* Significant at 1% level. 
** Significant at 5% level. 
*** Significant at 10% level. 
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Applicant Job Search  
The offer distribution in market j is given by Gj(w) in equation (1) in the text.  The 
probability that Aj applications will generate one top offer of  w  is 
j A
j )] w ( [G .  The density 
function associated with getting a top offer of w  in the jth market is . )] w ( )[G w ( g A
1 A
j j j
j−   The 
seeker will pick the best offer among the J potential submarkets.  This implies that the 





j )] w ( [G ) w Γ( ∏
=
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with associated density function 
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Given search costs cj, the discounted expected return from searching in the Ph.D. market net of 
search costs is 














* A c Γ(ξ)V dw ) ( w β V w γ
where ξ is the reservation compensation level.  The first term in brackets is the expected value of 
the best offer received while the second term is the probability that no offer of at least ξ is 
received across the J submarkets, multiplied by V*, the expected value of searching again next 
year.    The second term is the aggregated search costs across J markets.  Setting ξ = V = V
* 
generates the optimum formula for the reservation wage (2) in the text. 
  39Firm Search Strategies 
The distribution of net marginal products in submarket k is given by equation (4) in the 
text.  The probability that Ik interviews will generate a top net marginal product of   w) -   q (  in 
submarket k is  
k I




   
Interviewing across K submarkets, the cumulative distribution for a top net marginal product 
outcome of   w) -   q ( is 
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with associated density function  
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 w) -   q ( r I
 w) -   q ( ρ . 
With evaluation costs of hk, the employer’s expected discounted return from the interview 
process is 
(A6)  {} ∑ ∫
=
∞
− Ρ + − Β =
K
k
k kI h dq w q q
1
* ) ( ) (
ε ν ε ρ ν , 
where ε  is the reservation net marginal revenue for the employer and 
*
ν  is the expected value 
of searching again next period if no one is hired.  The first term in brackets is the expected net 
marginal product of the best interviewee while the second term is the probability that no 





ν  the expected value of searching again next year. Setting   we can 
derive the reservation net productivity condition (5) in the text.  Differentiating (5) with respect 
,
*
ν ν ε = =




=  for all k generates the remaining conditions (6) in the text.  Complete 
static derivatives are available from the authors on request. 
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